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INTRODUCTION 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) now represent a critical component in the 
infrastructure of most advanced economies. Nowhere is this truer than in Ireland which remains 
one of the most MNC dependent economies in the EU (cf. Barry 2002). However, as Cooke 
(2003: 4) notes, MNCs in their persistent quest to optimise profitability, “face a complex web of 
choices in configuring and reconfiguring their global operations”. Not least of these choices is 
the extent to which MNCs utilise globally consistent, standardised practices in their subsidiaries, 
or more localised practices adapted to fit their subsidiary’s host institutional context 
(Gooderham et al, 1999; Gunnigle et al, 2002a).  Drawing upon case study data, this paper 
focuses on the industrial relations (IR) approaches of US owned MNC subsidiaries in Ireland. 
US-owned MNCs represent by far the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) into 
Ireland, accounting for some 70% of industrial output (O’Higgins, 2002). While previous 
survey-based research (cf. Gunnigle 1995; Roche 2001) has identified a shift in the host business 
system which facilitates MNCs in their quest to introduce non-union approaches, little or no 
qualitative data has been brought to bear on this issue. Consequently, we present case-based 
evidence on the dynamics of this trend, focusing specifically on management approaches to 
collective employee representation and providing an exposition of the patterns of union 
recognition and avoidance in evidence.   
 
CONFIGURING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN THE US MNC SUBSIDIARY  
In the mid 1980s Tom Kochan and his colleagues developed a theoretical framework to 
explain the increase in trade union avoidance in the US (Kochan et al, 1986: 159). This focused 
on the interaction of a number of important causal factors in explaining the growth and diffusion 
of non-union approaches. Since our analysis focuses on US MNCs and their efforts to configure 
IR in foreign subsidiaries, we concentrate on a number of key factors seen as influencing IR in 
MNC subsidiaries. In this effort we employ a rational behaviour perspective (cf. Cooke 2001) to 
evaluate the choice of US subsidiaries to engage in union avoidance or recognition, and the 
nature of such engagement. In so doing we seek to identify the main motivators or drivers of 
behaviour of the parties and, secondly, to explain what factors influence their ability and actions 
to achieve those objectives (for example, legislative constraints in regard to trade union 
recognition). To this end we firstly consider the home country context and how this may affect 
the IR approach. We then consider the role played by the host country environment.   
That organisations are operating in an increasingly globalised business environment is 
without question. The immense economic and political significance of MNCs is well 
documented in the extant literature (cf. Hirst and Thompson, 1999). Increasingly MNCs are 
controlling vast numbers of subsidiaries in significantly different business contexts. Importantly, 
research suggests that the nature of the IR environment and the preferred approach to the 
management of the employment relationship is significant in influencing an MNC’s location 
decision (Cooke 1997, 2003; Cooke & Noble 1998). These studies consistently indicated that IR 
systems factors help shape FDI location decisions, with the direct consequence that 
Governments are increasingly faced with the difficult balancing act of, on the one hand, 
attracting FDI through favourable host system characteristics, such as lower levels of 
institutional constraints, and, on the other hand, ensuring individual and collective rights are 
protected through legislative provisions and supporting institutions. 
While the debate on the transformation of IR systems in response to the 
internationalisation of trade, technological innovation, etc., continues (cf. Sparrow & Hiltrop, 
1994), few would disagree that the American IR system is different to most other industrialised 
nations. It was precisely this belief that led Jacoby (1985: 173) to coin the term ‘American 
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exceptionalism’. Colling (2001:1) argues that ‘the prominence of the non-union sector is the 
single most striking feature of American employment relations’. However, we are also mindful 
of the tradition of unionisation and collective bargaining in the US. Although collective 
bargaining served as a key means of regulating IR in the twenty years following the introduction 
of the Wagner Act in 1935, the role accorded to organised labour in the US has generally been 
characterised as ‘modest’ (Kochan et al, 1986). Indeed Colling (2001:2) posits that US unions 
pursued their role “in ways designed to fetter management discretion and the ability to respond 
to external change”. Explanations for low unionisation rates include the fact that initially 
industrial income in the US was comparable to farm incomes and higher than factory workers in 
Europe. Other reasons include the absence of feudalism in the country, early mass 
enfranchisement, working class heterogeneity, high rates of social mobility, and a dominant 
value system which stresses individualism and personal achievement (cf. Guest, 1990; Wheeler, 
1993). Such explanations have drawn criticism, most notably for their focus on the impact of 
employee influences on union density and ignoring the hostility of US management towards 
unions (Ferner 2000; Jacoby, 1985). In this regard we witnessed the development of a 
distinctively American solution to the management of labour in the twentieth century, an 
approach which became known as ‘welfare capitalism’. Jacoby (1997) describes welfare 
capitalism as a management paradigm which viewed the industrial enterprise as the source of 
stability and security in modern society. It developed in the US in the early 1900s and firms 
using this approach exercised their paternalistic responsibility through forming company (in-
house) unions, paying good rates of pay and providing job security, good working conditions 
and elaborate recreational facilities (cf. Ferner & Quantanilla 2002; Jacoby, 1999). As Finkin 
(1999) notes, the essence of welfare capitalism lay in security against unemployment, sickness, 
and old age. The onset of the Great Depression led to the demise of welfare capitalism as firms 
were forced to rationalise operations and lay off workers. However, Jacoby (1999: 124) argues 
that welfare capitalism did not disappear but rather ‘went underground’. He found that welfare 
capitalism responded to the challenges presented by the New Deal and re-emerged in a 
modernised form in the post World War II era. He further argues that these welfare capitalist 
firms (including Eastman Kodak, Sears Roebuck and IBM) laid the groundwork for the modern 
non-union company. Such non-union firms which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s represented a 
distinctively American approach to the management of IR, notably in regard to their emphasis 
on HRM practices.  
Turning to the host country context, Ireland presents an interesting and somewhat distinctive 
host country context which is seen to contrast with the US in a number of ways. The most 
important of these are the argued legitimacy and influence of trade unions in Irish society, the 
high levels of centralisation in collective bargaining, the higher levels of union density and 
recognition, and the absence of a strong anti-union ideology/agenda among any of the major 
political parties (cf. Roche & Ashmore 2001). For over three decades, Irish Governments of all 
political hues have generally been advocates of national level accords on pay and other aspects 
of economic and social policy, involving negotiations between the main ‘social partners’ 
(Government, employers and trade unions). Such agreements have ensured that trade unions 
play a prominent role in public policy determination. This clearly contrasts the US experience, 
particularly in the 1980s where the Regan-led administrations adopted a strong anti-union 
agenda and created a particularly hostile political and economic climate for organised labour. It 
should be noted that - again in contrast to the US - the Irish ‘system’ of collective bargaining is 
grounded on largely voluntary principles, relying on the moral commitment of the participants to 
implement agreements achieved through the bargaining process.  Employers and trade unions 
are thus free to adhere to, or deviate from, the terms of such agreements. In international 
comparison, Ireland has a reasonably high, if falling, level of trade union density. The most 
recent figures suggest that in 1999 workforce density in Ireland was just over 44 per cent, a 
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figure considerably higher than in the US, where union density is approximately 13.5% and 
confined to a small number of industrial sectors (Roche & Ashmore, 2001).  
Moving to the level of the firm, while the choice of strategy and indeed the configuration of 
IR may in part be driven by the product market context, it is also influenced by managerial 
values. Kochan et al (1986: 55) argue that managerial values profoundly impact upon the 
choices that firms make in relation to preferred IR styles, acting as the lens through which 
‘managerial decision makers weigh their options for responding to cues from the external 
environment’.  We earlier noted that opposition to trade unions is characteristic of the value 
system of American managers. Poole (1986) observed that while managerial preferences have 
fluctuated over time, US employers have, in the main, embraced union avoidance against a more 
general trend of tacit acceptance of trade unions in Western Europe. This is often linked to the 
notion of ‘individualism’ in American society and the primacy accorded to private enterprise (cf. 
Guest, 1990; Jacoby, 1997). 
 Given our focus on US MNCs and their approaches to configuring collective 
representation, it is useful to reflect on the reasons why such firms would be motivated to 
operate with or without unions, or adopt particular forms of union engagement.  To this end, we 
employ a bounded rationality perspective (cf. Cooke, 2003) which assumes that MNCs seek to 
optimise company profitability and thus maximise operational performance at workplace level, 
while unions seek to act in ways perceived as maximising gains to workers. Thus managers 
would evaluate the choice of whether to engage in union avoidance or recognition on criteria 
related to the impact on operational performance and the bottom line. However, their decision or 
rationality may be bounded by constraints within the host environment, such as regulations 
which restrict employer freedom to set terms and conditions of employment, or impose 
significant transaction costs on making alterations to terms and conditions of employment.  
More significantly, Cooke (2003) points to the importance of the perceived added costs 
associated with union recognition and collective bargaining in evaluating the final configuration 
of subsidiary level IR. An important consideration here, as evident in international literature, is 
the impact of unionisation on measures of firm performance such as profitability, labour 
productivity and return on investment (cf. Freeman & Medoff, 1984). In evaluating this 
literature, Roche and Turner (1998) find the results on the impact of unionisation on productivity 
inconclusive but argue that the evidence from the manufacturing sector, particularly in the US, 
indicates that unionisation serves to reduce firm profitability. More generally, we find evidence 
that MNC managers attribute a number of disadvantages to having a union presence, inter alia, 
higher labour costs, protection of unsatisfactory workers, lower flexibility and responsiveness to 
change, promotion of trivial grievances and of an adversarial IR climate (cf. Flood and Toner 
1997). However, there are also potential costs associated with union avoidance, such as the need 
to provide competitive pay and conditions, the temptation to employ a more relaxed supervisory 
regime and the absence of a mechanism for dealing with collective grievances. A further 
consideration is that MNCs may perceive home country IR approaches as an important source of 
competitive advantage (cf. Barney, 1991) and seek to employ these in their foreign subsidiaries. 
Consequently they may view the prospect of trade union recognition as a further disadvantage 
because it may constrain their ability to diffuse these practices to subsidiaries due to union 
resistance or incongruence with the host country IR system. 
From a trade union perspective, it is evident that changing management approaches to IR 
have increased their difficulties in recruiting members and securing recognition in the private 
sector. At firm level, Green (1990) makes a particularly important distinction between the 
supply of an available union in a workplace, and the demand for a union by workers. Trade 
union presence in the workplace acts as a ‘gateway’, allowing workers to take up union 
membership. Factors associated with the occupation will also influence whether there is a 
recognised union available. In Ireland, for example, craft workers tend to be highly unionised 
and consequently their presence in a workplace increases the likelihood of union recognition. On 
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the demand side, we can identify a variety of reasons why workers might join trade unions, such 
as dissatisfaction with the work/supervisory climate, perceived poor management behaviour, 
ideological reasons, such as belief in collective solidarity, and other reasons such as peer 
pressure (cf. Flood and Toner, 1997). In the Irish context, it appears that a confluence of factors 
have resulted in the significant growth in union avoidance, particularly among US MNCs. 
Wallace (2003: 7) argues that the pattern of union avoidance among US firms which emerged in 
Ireland from the early 1980s mirrored the trend which had developed in the US a generation 
earlier: 
Essentially, non-unionisation started in a small number of US companies. 
Notable early non-union companies were Digital and Wang Laboratories. Unions 
tended not to initiate vigorous recruitment campaigns in such companies for a 
variety of reasons. Pay and conditions were good and there may have been a poor 
prospect of gaining employee backing for recognition or/and the fear of 
unfavourable publicity. The successful maintenance of the non-union status of 
these companies over an extended period, produced a “demonstration effect”, 
which challenged the conventional wisdom among personnel practitioners that 
unionisation was inevitable. 
 
We have already mentioned the increased scale of US FDI into Ireland in the 1990s. Much 
of this growth was in the information and communication technology (ICT) area (particularly 
electronics and software), a sector widely seen in the US context as overwhelmingly non-union 
(cf. Kochan et al., 1986). A change in the policy stance of Ireland’s state agencies with 
responsibility for attracting FDI was also a factor. During the 1960s and 1970s these bodies 
actively advised inward investing firms to recognise trade unions and engage in collective 
bargaining – an approach in line with practice in most larger organisations in Ireland at the time 
(McGovern, 1989). However, faced with increased international competition for FDI, these 
agencies have, since the early 1980s, adopted a ‘union neutral’ stance, indicating to inward 
investing MNCs their freedom to choose the non-union alternative should they so wish. Thus, 
over time union avoidance has become a common strategy among US MNCs.   
We will now outline the methodology underpinning the study prior to presenting our 
research findings.  
 
METHODOLOGY 
This paper draws on new data gathered from two detailed case studies of IR and HRM in 
the Irish subsidiaries of US MNCs in the pharmaceutical and healthcare sectors
i
. These sectors 
were chosen because they are largely dominated by MNCs, especially US MNCs, and also 
because of their significance to the Irish economy. They have also recently been targeted by 
Ireland’s main agency for promoting inward investment, IDA Ireland, for further development 
and investment. These sectors contribute some €35 billion per year to exports (IDA, 2000). Both 
of our case firms are identified through pseudonyms (Pharmaco and Healthco) to protect their 
anonymity. Pharmaco is one of the world’s leading pharmaceutical firms, employing 
approximately 90,000 people worldwide and boasting revenues in excess of $30 billion. 
Healthco operates in both the medical products and pharmaceutical sectors, employs over 
70,000 people worldwide and has revenues in excess of $15 billion. Both these MNCs operate at 
a number of Irish sites and employ in the region of 4000 people in the country.  
Access to both case companies was extremely good. The data used in this paper were 
collected primarily through interviews with company personnel. Information was also gathered 
through reviews of company documentation, web site data and observation. A series of in-depth 
interviews (26 in total) were held with all top management team members in the Irish 
subsidiaries, a reasonable cross section of middle ranking and front line managers/team leaders, 
shop floor workers, employee representatives (shop stewards) and trade union officials. 
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Interviews lasted a minimum of one hour and were tape recorded for accuracy and later 
transcribed. Some people were interviewed more than once. Interviews were conducted by a 
minimum of two interviewers. Interviewees were fully briefed in advance regarding the research 
agenda/nature of issues being investigated. The interviews were semi-structured and covered 
broadly similar themes in each instance.  
 
CASE STUDY FINDINGS 
 
Trade Union Recognition and Avoidance   
In our earlier discussion on the IR approaches of US MNCs, we pointed to the fact that 
US firms are commonly characterised by antipathy towards trade unions and preference for 
more individualised management-employee relations and non-union status (cf. Jacoby, 1997). 
Both Healthco and Pharmaco entered into union recognition agreements covering the majority 
of employees on establishing their first operations in Ireland. Thus collective bargaining 
arrangements were set in train from the outset and remain the main vehicle for handling IR 
issues in these original plants to the present day. The decision to recognise trade unions 
represented a major departure from home country practice: the General Manager of Healthco 
reported that all of their American plants  were ‘staunchly non-union’, in some cases moving to 
rural areas partly as a method of union avoidance, while the Head of HR in Pharmaco indicated 
that, at the time of establishment, the company was ‘a typical American multinational’ and 
‘solidly non-union in the States’.  
We found that both firms took the advice of the Industrial Development Authority (the 
predecessor of IDA Ireland) during the original start-up, to embrace a strategy of union 
recognition using post-entry closed shop arrangements. This was also in line with the advice of 
the Federated Union of Employers, the main employers association at the time. Also significant 
in the decision of both firms to recognise trade unions was the highly publicised and failed 
attempt by EI (an American MNC subsidiary) to operate on a non union basis in Ireland in 1968 
(cf. McGovern, 1989). A final contributory, but arguably much less significant factor, was the 
fact that both firms had a requirement for craft workers, which tend to be a highly unionised 
occupational category: the HR Director of Healthco observed that craft unions tended to be quite 
protective of their craft by ensuring that only ‘card-carrying [unionised] workers were permitted 
to undertake certain types of work’. Interviewees pointed to a range of these factors in 
explaining the decision of these traditionally non-union firms to recognise trade unions. The 
following quote is illustrative of the opinions we elicited:  
 
 When they first came to Ireland in the late 1960s they would have done an assessment 
about whether to go union or non-union, but the climate at the time in Ireland was very 
much union. There was that firm’s case of union recognition in Shannon where a 
company was shut down [sic] through failing to recognise a union [the EI dispute 
referred to above]. This was prominent in the minds of management at that stage so they 
took the advice of the FUE and recognised the unions. 
Head, HR,  Pharmaco 
 
Thus the overall IR strategy adopted by both Pharmaco and Healthco was to recognise 
trade unions representing operator and craft categories from start-up. Pay increases for both 
these grouping are subject to collective bargaining involving separate negotiations with general 
and craft groups on a plant-by-plant basis. We also found that both firms traditionally operated 
outside the terms of nationally negotiated agreements which have been the predominant 
mechanism for setting pay norms for unionised workers in Ireland. Healthco has consistently 
agreed pay increases above the norm set down in national agreements. For example, in 2002 
unionised workers in Healthco received pay increases described by Industrial Relations News 
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(IRN) as ‘a good deal higher’ than that prescribed under the prevailing national pay accord, 
while a separate IRN report found that that the company concluded the largest number of ‘above 
the norm deals’ during a particular accord (IRN Report: see end note i). A similar trend was 
evident in Pharmaco, where recent negotiations resulted in operator grades receiving pay 
increases ‘well in excess’ of the prevailing national accord (IRN report). This report further 
observed that Pharmaco had agreed pay increases significantly above the norm set out in 
national accords even before the ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom of the 1990s.  
Turning to contemporary IR developments, by far the most significant finding relates to the 
decision of both these MNCs to adopt a non-union strategy in their more recently established 
Irish plants. In both cases we find a trend of increased union avoidance over recent years. This is 
particularly pronounced in Healthco. Initially, union avoidance occurred in relation to the 
opening of their small Plant 4. More notably, the larger Plants 5 and 6, opened subsequently, 
also operate now on a non-union basis. The non-union status of these new plants (4, 5 & 6), all 
established in geographic proximity to the older established unionised plants, represent a 
significant departure from the initial policy of union recognition via post-entry closed shop 
agreements. Pharmaco presents a similar picture: their new pharmaceutical plant, opened on a 
greenfield site in the recent past, was also established on a non-union basis.  
In commenting on this trend of union avoidance in Pharmaco’s newer plants, a union 
official noted this pointed to a change in direction with regard to subsidiary level IR. His union, 
which represents operative and some other grades in Pharmaco’s older plants, was refused 
access to workers in the new plant despite repeated requests to meet and address them. He noted: 
 
[Pharmaco] Ireland appears to have a new approach to industrial relations and I think if 
they had their time again they would be non-union or at least seek to be as non-union as 
possible. 
Union Official 1 
 
He further cited management’s wish to increase  prerogative and their desire to curry favour 
at corporate level as the key drivers of the change in direction.  While acknowledging the 
influence of corporate HQ, this  union official felt that this change in strategy was primarily 
driven by local management: 
 
It’s a matter of change…immediate change without a grievance procedure to discuss it. 
When management want to change, they don’t want to have anyone, particularly a union 
coming in and saying ‘wait, you have to discuss that with us’. 
 
I think it [the move towards non-unionism] is coming from the States but it is also a new 
breed of management that’s online [in Ireland] as such. In that you had [in the past] the 
[former Head of HR] and he had a unique way of dealing with things. Things took time 
but you always knew you would get things sorted…the problem I see with it today is that 
there are so many companies [Pharmaco sites] around ..and they are all jockeying for 
position. Their [HR’s] attitude is we will drive as much as we can. We won’t talk to 
unions as much as we can, we delay everything as much as we can. We drive as hard as 
we can to get the most out of people and we’ll look good. We’ll get our names in lights. 
 
So what was the management rationale for going non-union in the more recently established 
plants and what specific approaches, if any, did management use to expedite this policy? 
Perhaps the most immediate question which springs to mind, given our finding on the existence 
of ‘good’ management-employee relations in Healthco, is why might management diverge from 
a tried and trusted approach which appears to have worked well, and, most pertinently, from 
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where did the decision to go non-union emanate? Interestingly, our findings suggest that the 
decision to go non-union was taken largely on the initiative of the Irish top management team: 
 
It was the preference of Irish management ….If local management had wanted to go the 
union route, we could have convinced corporate to agree. It was our preference 
 
HR Manager, Healthco 
 
On the question of ‘why go non union’, this seemed largely a management decision 
conditioned by a number of factors. Firstly, management seemed fairly confident that they 
would encounter limited union opposition to such a policy. Secondly, they felt that, on balance, 
it would make management’s task easier in the new facilities. In our attempts to get management 
to elaborate on the latter rationale, it seems that management felt that even ‘small changes’ are 
sometimes difficult to implement in the unionised plants and that non union status gives 
management the ‘ability to get changes done quicker’ (HR Manager, Healthco). However, as we 
have mentioned the choice to go non-union was not an absolute priority with the Irish 
management, simply a preferred choice which they would implement if it could be achieved in a 
straightforward manner. The following comment from the Healthco HR manager with 
responsibility for both unionised and non-union plants largely reflects the balance of opinion 
among the management team on the decision to go non-union:  
 
It is not a huge issue though, just a preference. We don’t have militant unions here. We 
get on fine. Going non union is less hassle, especially with the operators. Here [plant 1] 
we meet with [the trade union for general workers] formally once a week and informally 
almost every day. The [craft union] situation is much easier, we meet formally once a 
year and have good relations with them. Demarcation can be a bit of an issue between 
the two operator grades but it’s not huge.  
 
In Healthco we also investigated management’s choice of union avoidance in their newer 
sites. Here, senior management indicated that Plant 4 largely employed technicians, while Plant 
5 was their ‘high tech’ facility, initially only employing engineers and other qualified technical 
categories, all of whom, management claimed, ‘were not pre-disposed to take up union 
membership’. While Plant 4 remains largely staffed by technicians, Plant 5 now employs a 
significant number of general operatives, posing the conundrum of why these have not sought to 
unionise. Here the management argument was twofold. They suggested that the operative level 
employees in Plant 4 were ‘mostly quite young’ and thus ‘not all that pushed’ about union 
membership (HR manager). Secondly, they argued that the company treated employees well, 
both in terms of pay and the general quality of work life, and thus employees had little incentive 
to unionise: 
 
A few years ago they [a section of employees in Plant 4] made moves to say they wanted 
to join a union but that was overcome with increased communication. The plant had 
grown so fast and I think they were disgruntled at how things had changed. 
 
HR Director, Healthco 
 
By and large, it appears the company encountered little serious union opposition to its 
decision to go non-union in its new sites. The opinion of the Chief Shop Steward (general union) 
is instructive here: 
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Not once did (general workers trade union) even make a play for [plant 4] or the 
new one. It surprised me to say the least. 
 
While pursuing a non-union strategy in its new plants is clearly a departure from tradition for 
Healthco and Pharmaco, it is very much in line with the recent practice among new inward 
investing companies (cf. Gunnigle, 1995). Hitherto, the conventional wisdom was that older 
MNCs, which had recognised unions from the outset, largely maintained this approach, while 
newer inward investing MNCs, especially those in the ICT sector, tended to opt for non-union 
status (cf. Gunnigle et al 2002b; Roche, 2001). The evidence from both our cases raises the 
spectre of union avoidance becoming a growing trend among longer established MNCs with a 
record of active engagement with collective bargaining.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Trade union recognition and avoidance is an area of intense current debate in Irish public 
policy. This debate stems from a significant fall in levels of trade union density experienced in 
Ireland over the past two decades or more. As noted earlier an important factor in this decline 
has been the increased level of union avoidance in the MNC sector, most especially among US 
MNCs. A study of firms which established at greenfield sites in Ireland over the period 1987-
1997, found that 65 per cent of firms were non-union (Gunnigle et al 2002b). Non-unionism was 
by far the most prevalent among US MNCs: only 14 per cent recognised trade unions compared 
with an equivalent figure of 80 per cent among European owned MNCs. Roche (2001) similarly 
found a sharp increase in union avoidance in US workplaces established since 1980. The trend 
of US MNCs opting to establish on a non-union basis contrasts with the research evidence on IR 
practice among inward investing firms up to the 1980s which  found that such MNCs generally 
recognised unions and engaged in collective bargaining (Enderwick, 1986; Kelly & Brannick, 
1985).   
Looking at the evidence from both our case firms we find what appears on initial review to 
be a relatively traditional picture. Both MNCs recognised two trade unions representing manual 
and craft categories. Pay and other major IR issues in these plants are handled via collective 
bargaining on a plant-by-plant basis. We have seen that the practice of entering into union 
recognition agreements at start-up stage was a standard feature of IR practice in the FDI sector 
in the 1960s and 1970s. These ‘sweetheart deals’ as they became known, allowed new firms to 
prescribe which trade unions it wished to deal with. The decision to recognise trade unions and 
engage in collective bargaining in both firms clearly aligned their IR approach with the 
prevailing trend among inward investing MNCs of the time. It also represented a departure from 
home country practice of union avoidance. It seems that the advice of the local management 
team, the IDA, and the Federated Union of Employers convinced Corporate HQ to go the union 
route.  
While it is clear that collective bargaining goes on as normal in Healthco’s and Pharmaco’s 
unionised facilities, the shift to non-union status in its newer plants represents by far the most 
significant IR departure since these firms arrived in Ireland. Having first established its small 
plant 4 on a non-union basis some years ago, Healthco has since opted for non-union status in 
all of its recently established plants. This decision appears to have been taken largely on the 
initiative of the Irish management team, albeit in the knowledge that it accorded with the 
preference of corporate HQ. Likewise the decision by Pharmaco to take the non-union route 
seems to have been primarily driven at subsidiary level. Regardless of the source of these 
decisions, the adoption of union avoidance strategies by both these major MNCs gives support 
to the argument that host country effects are increasingly being overridden by the country of 
origin effects in regard to IR practice in MNC subsidiaries (Roche 2001; Turner et al, 1997). We 
earlier referred to evidence of a general growth in resistance to trade union recognition in Ireland 
during the 1980s and 1990s, mostly among US MNCs (cf. Gunnigle, 1995; McGovern 1989). 
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However, it is also important to point out that increased resistance to union penetration is not 
exclusive to Ireland, but also evident internationally. Even in the US, where employers have 
traditionally opposed union recognition, we find evidence of an increased intensity in opposition 
since the 1980s (cf. Blanchflower & Freeman, 1992), while the UK Workplace Industrial 
Relations Surveys indicate a fall in union recognition among newly established companies 
(Cully et al, 1999).  
However, the concurrent adoption of union recognition and avoidance in sister plants 
represents an important development in the Irish context. We know that union de-recognition, 
which Bassett (1986) identifies as the sharpest form of union avoidance, is quite uncommon in 
Ireland, although the UK witnessed some important cases since the 1980s. While neither of our 
cases entails de-recognition, they are examples of so called ‘double-breasting’ arrangements, 
whereby a multi-plant organisation recognises trade unions in some (older) plants but does not 
concede union recognition in other (newer) plants. While the growth in the incidence of ‘double-
breasting’ in the UK was predicted by Beaumont and Harris (1992), its development in Ireland 
is somewhat unexpected. We earlier noted that Ireland’s IR landscape has long been 
characterised by national level agreements between Government, employer associations and 
trade unions. This level of national engagement affords Irish trade unions very significant 
influence in shaping economic and social policy. At enterprise level too, recent centralised 
agreements have explicitly sought to promote partnership based IR arrangements. One would 
therefore expect that this context of ‘social partnership’ would ensure the endurance of a strong 
role for unions in Irish society and of pluralist IR traditions. Clearly this is not the case. Taken in 
concert with the progressive trend of increased union avoidance among new MNCs in Ireland, 
the prospect of increased ‘double-breasting’ among older MNCs exacerbates the already grave 
difficulties which unions encounter in organising the MNC sector. Ireland has recently seen an 
important change in public policy in regard to FDI, which seeks to shift the focus away from 
attracting new Greenfield start-ups towards more deeply embedding existing MNCs through the 
attraction of higher order investment. The healthcare and pharmaceutical sectors are to the 
forefront of this strategy. Several long established MNCs in this sector have recently announced 
major expansions to their Irish operations, the most high profile being Wyeth Medical’s new 
‘bio-technology campus’ in Dublin, claimed to be the largest ‘single site biotechnology facility 
in the world’ (IDA, 2001: 1). Our findings suggest that such sites will increasingly operate on a 
non-union basis, despite the fact that longer established sister facilities were highly unionised. 
More generally it implies that union penetration in a very large part of the Irish private sector is 
being impeded by (a)  the fact that new FDI, particularly in the ICT sector, is overwhelmingly 
non-union, and (b)  the emerging trend of ‘double-breasting’ in sectors where union recognition 
was once the accepted norm. In essence, union penetration is being challenged at two critical 
junctures in the FDI ‘life cycle’ - among new inward investing MNCs, and now in longer 
established MNCs which are increasing their foothold in the country.  
Of particular interest are the reasons why both these long established MNCs have chosen 
to operate their new sites on a non-union basis. We first consider enterprise level factors. In our 
findings we described three broad rationales, as articulated by management, to explain their 
decision, namely: (a) flexibility: management felt going non-union would allow them greater 
freedom in making and implementing operational decisions; (b) workforce profile: management 
argued that these new sites employed younger, better educated workers who were ‘less inclined’ 
to seek union membership; (c) capacity: management were confident they would encounter little 
union opposition to their decision.  
If we apply a rational behaviour lens to management’s decision, we would expect the 
decision to ‘double-breast’ be made on the premise that it would enhance operational 
performance in the particular site, and thus contribute to increased company profitability (cf. 
Cooke, 2003; Freeman & Medoff, 1984).  Overtly, only the first of the three categories above 
(enhanced flexibility in decision making) would seem to impinge directly on operational 
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performance. Even then, the impact on performance is unclear: management seemed mainly 
interested in increasing the speed of decision making, and their own prerogative, by avoiding 
what they saw as an unnecessarily protracted negotiation/consultative process. However, the 
final category (capacity to go non-union) also reflects increased management prerogative: in 
contrast to their counterparts who decided to recognise trade unions on first establishing in 
Ireland, the current top management teams seem confident of their ability to establish and 
sustain non-union status.  
 In addition to these espoused reasons for double-breasting’, we feel two other factors are 
important in explaining management’s decision.  Firstly, in relation to pay bargaining, we find 
emerging evidence of management initiatives to curb the level of pay increases in unionised 
sites and bring them more in line with practice in the non-union sites. We noted earlier that both 
firms’s unionised plants have traditionally operated outside of national accords, concluding pay 
deals which were invariably above the norm. A 2002 IRN review found that both of these firms 
had negotiated ‘key local pay deals’ above the terms set down in the prevailing national accord 
(IRN Report: see end note I). This report identified pharmaceuticals and healthcare as the sectors 
with the consistently largest numbers of ‘above the norm deals’, labelling them as ‘normally 
recession-proof’ sectors. Recent developments in our case companies question this assertion. In 
2004, for the first time, Pharmaco, has taken a firm stance in stating it will hold the line and not 
pay more than the prevailing national agreement. More pertinently, the Irish Labour Court 
recently upheld Healthco’s offer to pay similar terms to that of the prevailing national accord in 
its main manufacturing plant, citing the company’s ‘more difficult trading position’ and 
rejecting the  trade union’s claim for an above the norm increase. Thus, both firms are now 
moving to bring their pay deals into line with national norms. This ‘above the norm’ issue does 
not appear to arise in the non-union sites, suggesting that there is a real pay advantage to be 
gained from double breasting. Secondly, we feel there is also a micro-political advantage to be 
gained from double breasting. A consistent theme which emerged in our discussions with both 
top management teams was their desire to garner favour with corporate HQ so as to attract 
higher order investment and, effectively, extend the Irish subsidiary’s corporate mandate. Both 
appear to have been highly successful in this regard: Healthco and Pharmaco have announced 
very considerable investments in Ireland over the recent past. The fact that much of this 
investment is in non-union sites was clearly a factor which went down well at corporate level. In 
Healthco, for example, the Irish HR manager emphasised that while the decision to ‘double-
breast’ was ‘the preference of Irish management’, they were also acutely aware that it was ‘what 
US (corporate) management wanted’.  
  The other explanation proffered by management for choosing the non-union route was 
that of workforce profile, namely that these new sites largely employed younger, well educated 
workers who had ‘little interest’ in joining trade unions. This demand side explanation relates to 
the impact of longer term structural shifts in employment, particularly the decline in the numbers 
of manual/blue collar workers and growth in the proportion of so called ‘knowledge workers’, 
on union membership (Kumar, 1995; Valkenburg, 1996). We earlier noted that both our case 
firms had seen considerable growth in the scale of their Irish operations over recent years, due to 
the attraction of ‘higher order’ investment. This resulted in increased employment, involving an 
influx of younger workers, a large proportion of who were third level graduates. In Healthco, we 
saw that the HR Director stated that their new more highly qualified workers ‘were not pre-
disposed to take up union membership’. This management line that younger, better educated 
workers have a lower propensity to unionise is not supported by data on overall patterns of 
union membership in Ireland. The 1996 Labour Force Survey (CSO, 1996) found that 
professional and technical workers had the highest level of unionisation of any occupational 
category. In regard to educational attainment it similarly found that third level graduates had the 
highest level of unionisation. Thus, we would argue that the critical factor explaining non-
membership of trade unions in the new sites is not a lower propensity of workers to join unions 
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but rather the lack of union availability. We know that most analyses of union membership 
orientations in the developed world indicate that the most workers fall into the category of 
passive membership orientation, i.e. they have a largely ambivalent attitude towards union 
membership (cf. Flood et al 1996; Nicholson et al 1981). In contrast to the older sites where 
union membership was, de facto, a condition of employment for many workers, the new sites 
lack any vestige of union presence. This lack of a union presence in our case firms, or 
information thereon, means that new employees are not afforded any opportunity to take up 
union membership: in effect the ‘gateway’ to union membership is closed off (cf. Green, 1990).  
While developments within MNCs are clearly important in regard to the configuration of  
IR policy and practice in subsidiaries,  it is widely accepted that developments in the external 
environment, particularly the social, political and economic climate in the  host environment, are 
critical in establishing the context and parameters within which subsidiary level arrangements 
are constructed. Of particular note in this regard is our conclusion that a key factor in both 
subsidiaries’ decision to go non-union was the Irish management team’s capacity to choose this 
alternative. Numerous commentators have noted Ireland’s long track record in competing 
aggressively for FDI. Having pursued a protectionist approach to industrial development since 
independence, Ireland reversed this policy stance in the late 1950s. With the objective of 
accelerating industrialisation, the country set out  to attract FDI through a series of incentives, 
including, grants, subsidies and low tax on profits. This strategy has clearly impacted on the host 
IR context and the behaviour and approaches of the key IR actors, particularly with respect to 
the role of the State. Over recent decades we have witnessed considerable change in public 
policy in regard to trade unions. In line with the extant literature (cf. McGovern, 1989), our case 
evidence shows that the main industrial promotions agency, the IDA, encouraged both 
companies to recognise trade unions on first establishing in Ireland. Such state agencies have 
now shifted position, emphasising the capacity for inward investing companies to opt for non- 
union status should they so wish. Our discussions with union officials confirmed this change. 
One such official noted that during a recent case, which his trade union had taken against a US 
MNC, under Ireland’s recent ‘right to bargain’ legislation, his General Secretary was contacted 
by a senior IDA Ireland official and informed that if recognition was secured the company may 
close their Irish operation: 
 
On the night before the ..hearing, the IDA got onto our General Secretary 
threatening that the company were going to walk out of the country if this [ case] 
was carried through. In fairness, our  General Secretary rang me and I said we 
have a right to discuss this and I don’t believe them. There is no company going 
to walk because of unionisation…. there are hundreds of  millions invested [in 
Ireland by this MNC]  
 
This change in Irish public policy over time is aptly captured in the contrast between the 
recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry Report (1969) on the EI trade union recognition 
dispute that “incoming companies should recognise the industrial relations of this country and 
the inevitability of union recognition” (McGovern, 1989: 63), with the following statement from 
the then Minister for Enterprise and Employment over quarter of a century later (Hourihan 1996:  
21):  
  
The IDA is there to encourage the establishment of new companies. It is not there 
to press one particular way of dealing with industrial relations. I don’t see that as 
part of the IDA agenda....Some companies have an approach to personnel 
relations which doesn’t involve (trade) unions… fine, we have to be realistic and 
recognise that that is the approach they have taken. We can’t set preconditions. 
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In evaluating the dynamic between home and host country business systems in the 
management of foreign subsidiaries of US MNCs, we find  clear evidence of the evolving nature 
of business systems, particularly in the host country (Ireland) and the resultant impact on 
management practice in our case firms. Of particular consequence is the emergence and 
predicted growth of ‘double-breasting’. Arguably the ability of these firms to choose the non-
union route in their recently established plants is closely linked to the change in conditions 
prevailing in the Irish business system. Because of Ireland’s dependence on FDI, successive 
Governments have increasingly sought to position Ireland a ‘new’ economy: pro-business and 
enterprise, and thus a suitable location for inward investing MNCs. One aspect of such 
positioning is the relative absence of constraining IR regulations and institutions which might 
impose alien IR  practices on inward investing MNCs. 
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END NOTES 
 
 
                                                 
i
 In this paper we have not provided the full references to any documentation which would reveal the 
name of the company.  
